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History, Tradition, the Supreme Court,




My advice to an attorney litigating a case before the current
Supreme Court is to buy a copy of Blackstone's history of the common
law or at least a good book on legal history. In virtually every area of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court increasingly is relying on tradition
as its guide in decisionmaking. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has de-
nied constitutional protection by holding that the claimed right was not
historically protected. The Court is often explicit in stating that rights
should be protected only if there has been a tradition of judicial safe-
guards, and its analysis frequently is accompanied by a lengthy exegesis
on common-law practices.
I believe that this is a perverse and undesirable method of interpret-
ing the Constitution. What has been done in the past cannot answer
normatively what the law should be in the future. Above all, the Consti-
tution exists to check democratic majorities and ensure protection of the
core values concerning the structure of government, basic liberties, and
equality. Interpreting the Constitution primarily based on history allows
the meaning of an antimajoritarian document to depend on the historical
practices followed by majoritarian institutions. As Chief Justice John
Marshall declared long ago, the Constitution is meant to "endure for
ages to come" and therefore "to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."' Tying the Constitution to past practices inhibits the
Constitution's growth and prevents essential constitutional evolution.
The theme of this Symposium is the "changing face of constitutional
interpretation," with the First Amendment as the central example. In
* Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I want
to thank Sandy Lepson and Dana Milmeister for their excellent research assistance. I am also
grateful to the participants at this Symposium and to the participants at a faculty workshop at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School for their helpful comments.
I. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 345 (1819).
this Essay, I want to make three major points about the way in which the
complexion of constitutional decisionmaking-in the area of the First
Amendment and elsewhere-is being altered. First, Part I discusses the
increasing reliance on tradition in Supreme Court constitutional interpre-
tation. Second, Part II considers why history has become so important
in contemporary constitutional law. I suggest two related reasons. The
desire for an external constraint on judicial decisionmaking has led to the
use of history as a seemingly objective reference. Also, the conservative
Court's desire to defer to the government and reject individual rights is
served by historical analysis because litigants virtually always assert
rights that were not protected at common law.
Finally, in Part III, I contend that the focus on history and tradition
as the primary basis for decisionmaking is deeply flawed. Historical
practice is certainly one factor to consider in deciding, for example,
whether a right is fundamental. But tradition should not be the primary
or even the most important factor. History cannot serve its desired goal
of constraining judges. Further, it is normatively inappropriate to base
the Constitution's contemporary meaning solely on the practices that
others at different times found acceptable.
I. The Growth in the Use of History
The Supreme Court's reliance on history as a basis for decisions is
certainly not new. Countless nineteenth century decisions relied on his-
tory as a justification, perhaps most notably-and most infamously-
Dred Scott v. Sanford,2 in which Chief Justice Taney wrote a historical
"essay on the Negro's role in early America, designed to establish that
the Constitution was a 'white man's document.' "3
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has contin-
ued to cite history and tradition as a basis for its holdings.4 For example,
during the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court stated that it would look
to tradition in determining what rights were fundamental and, therefore,
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.
Justice Frankfurter, for example, declared that due process protects "the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples." 5 In Rochin v. Califor-
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
3. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119,
125 (citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403-04).
4. For a discussion of many examples of the use of history and tradition, see CHARLES
A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969) (using examples such
as reapportionment and the First Amendment decisions).
5. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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nia,6 the Court explained that due process safeguards liberties that are
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental."'7
In the area of the First Amendment, which is the focus of this Sym-
posium, the Court frequently has invoked history as a basis for its deci-
sions. For instance, in Roth v. United States,8 the Court used history to
support its conclusion that the First Amendment does not protect ob-
scenity.9 Although there were no laws criminalizing pornography at the
time the Bill of Rights was ratified, the Court noted that thirteen of the
fourteen states that by 1792 had ratified the Constitution had laws
prohibiting libel, and that each of those states had laws criminalizing
either blasphemy or profanity or both.10 In New York Times v. Sulli-
van," the Court described the history of seditious libel and noted that
although the Sedition Act of 1798 "was never tested in this Court, the
attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." 12
Although history long has been a part of Supreme Court opinions,
in the past decade there appears to have been a much greater reliance on
history and tradition as a method of constitutional interpretation. Quan-
titatively, I have had the impression that more decisions are based on
conclusions about historical practices. My impression was confirmed by
Professor Rebecca Brown, who found that in 1990 and 1991, 83 majority
opinions invoked tradition, compared to only 216 uses of tradition in
majority opinions in the decade between 1980 and 1990.13 Perhaps more
importantly, qualitatively, tradition is playing a different role in constitu-
tional analysis: increasingly, the Court uses tradition as a limit on the
Constitution's meaning. In other words, a substantial change in the law
has been effected by the Court's repeated statements and rulings that the
Constitution does not protect more than has been traditionally safe-
guarded. This has been evident in virtually every area of individual
rights, including First Amendment jurisprudence.
Substantive due process is the most obvious area where the Court
has relied on tradition as a limit on the Constitution's meaning. Recent
6. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
7. Id. at 169 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. Id. at 484 ("[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of ob-
scenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.").
10. Id. at 482.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. Id at 276.
13. Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight: A Theory of Cognitive Interpretation (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
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due process cases, involving everything from gay and lesbian rights to
personal jurisdiction, have turned on the Court's historical analysis.1 4
For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,1 5 the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not protect a right to engage in private homosexual
activity, justifying its conclusion largely on the traditional prohibition of
such conduct. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that the
prohibition against sodomy has "ancient roots," having been forbidden
in all thirteen of the original states and 32 of the 37 existing states at the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 16 He also noted that as
recently as 1961, homosexual activity was outlawed in all fifty states.1 7
Justice White then concluded: "Against this background, to claim
that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best, facetious." 18 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger went
even further, quoting Blackstone's description of sodomy as an "infa-
mous crime against nature ... the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature." 19
A few years later, in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,20 the Court relied on
tradition to deny constitutional protection to a biological father who
wanted visitation rights with his child. Michael H. involved a challenge
to a California law that created an irrebuttable presumption that a mar-
ried woman's husband is the father of her child. 21 The biological father,
whose paternity had been unequivocally established and who had lived
with the child while functioning in a parental role, challenged the law.22
The Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia, upheld the California
law and ruled against the biological father.23 Justice Scalia stated that
the existence of a "liberty interest [must] be rooted in history and tradi-
tion."'24 He then defended the constitutionality of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy by citing as authority H. Nicholas's 1836 work,
14. For earlier examples of history as the basis for substantive due process analysis, see
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16. Id. at 192-93.
17. Id. at 193; see also infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
18. Id. at 194.
19. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
20. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
21. Id. at 117.
22. Id. at 114.
23. Id. at 132.
24. Id. at 123.
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Adulterine Bastardy,25 which cited Bracton's 1659 book, and quoting
from Blackstone's 1826 treatise,26 and a family law treatise from 1882.27
In response to the dissent's argument that the majority was eschew-
ing a long tradition of protecting parental rights, Justice Scalia stated
that "[w]e refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identi-
fied."'28 In other words, by Justice Scalia's view, a right can be protected
under the Due Process Clause only if there is a very specific tradition of
recognizing the right.
Justice Scalia repeated this position in another case under the Due
Process Clause, Burnham v. Superior Court,29 which concerned a state's
ability to exercise personal jurisdiction based on service of process while
a person was briefly in the state. Justice Scalia, again writing for the
plurality, began his opinion by quoting the English Year Books from
1482 and Lord Coke in 1612.30 The Court then proceeded to uphold
transitory personal jurisdiction based on a lengthy examination of nine-
teenth century precedents. Justice Scalia expressly rejected the idea of
basing due process analysis on "contemporary notions of due process,"
claiming instead that the focus should be on "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. '31
The Court's reliance on history as a limit on the scope of individual
rights is also found in cases arising under the constitutional provisions
concerning criminal procedure. For instance, in California v. Hodari
D.,32 the Court held that the seizure of a person occurs under the Fourth
Amendment only when there is either the application of physical force or
a show of authority that effectively restrains the person. 33 In justifying
this conclusion, the Court analyzed the common-law meaning of
"seizure," including a discussion of nineteenth century common law. 34
25. Id. at 124 (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTERINE BASTARDY 9-10 (1836) (citing
BRAcTON, DE LEGIBUSET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIE (1659) (noting the presumption of le-
gitimacy was a fundamental principle at common law)).
26. Id. (citing I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 456 (Chitty ed. 1826)).
27. Id. at 124-25 (citing J. SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 306 (3d ed.
1882)).
28. Id. at 127-28 n.6.
29. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
30. Id. at 608 (citing The Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1041 (K.B. 1612), and Bowser
v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482)).
31. Id. at 623.
32. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
33. Id. at 1552.
34. Id. at 1549-50.
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In Harmelin v. Michigan,35 the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for posses-
sion of more than 650 grams of cocaine.36 In rejecting the claim that the
mandatory sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, the Court began with a discussion of
punishments imposed by the infamous Lord Chief Jeffreys of the King's
Bench during the Stuart reign of James II. 37 After considering permissi-
ble punishments in seventeenth century England, the Court focused on
acceptable sanctions in nineteenth century America. Largely on the ba-
sis of this historical common-law analysis, the Court upheld the harsh
sentence. 3
8
The reliance on history and tradition as a limit on the scope of rights
is also evident in First Amendment decisions. For example, in deciding
whether government property should be regarded as a "public forum"
available for speech, the Court focuses heavily on traditional practice. In
its recent decision in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 39 the Supreme Court held that airports are not public forums.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphasized that air-
ports are a relatively modem development and that therefore, by defini-
tion, there could not be a sufficient tradition of availability for speech
activities.4o The Chief Justice wrote: "Reflecting the general growth of
the air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently achieved
their contemporary size and character. But given the lateness with
which the modem air terminal has made its appearance," it does not
qualify as a public forum.41
The emphasis on history and tradition also is evident in cases under
the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Marsh v. Chambers42 is a
particularly striking example of a decision based entirely on historical
analysis. Marsh involved an Establishment Clause challenge to Ne-
braska's state-paid employment of a Presbyterian minister as the state
legislature's chaplain for sixteen years. 43 The Supreme Court did not ap-
ply or analyze the issue under the traditional three-prong test of Lemon
35. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
36. Id. at 2702.
37. Id. at 2687-88.
38. Id. at 2681.
39. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
40. Id. at 2706.
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
43. Id. at 784-85.
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v. Kurtzman.44 Instead, the Marsh Court focused on history.45 The
Court reviewed the employment of legislative chaplains dating back to
the first Congress and concluded: "From colonial times through the
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer
has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious
freedom." 46
These examples-drawn from substantive due process, criminal pro-
cedure provisions such as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, and the
First Amendment-are simply representative illustrations of a much
larger body of cases. Common to these cases is the Supreme Court's use
of history and tradition to reject claims of individual rights. The Court
openly declares that the scope of constitutional rights is limited to that
which has been historically protected. The Court then reviews history
and concludes that there is no tradition of judicial protection in the par-
ticular area. Over and over again, history is the determinative method of
constitutional interpretation.
Some might respond to the description of these cases by saying that
it assumes that the Court's analysis is historical simply because its opin-
ions are written in historical terms. In other words, perhaps history is
just the rhetoric the Court uses to express conclusions arrived at on other
grounds.47 This may well be true, but it does not undermine the impor-
tance of focusing on the use of history as part of the changing face of
constitutional interpretation. First, at the very least, it is important to
see the significance of history in contemporary Supreme Court rhetoric
and analyze the cause of such a growth in reliance on this style of argu-
ment. Second, it is necessary to consider whether such arguments are
persuasive. Is it a sufficient justification for the rejection of a constitu-
tional right that it has not been traditionally safeguarded? Third, even if
history and tradition are often used by the Court merely as convenient
44. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In Lemon, the Court ruled that statutes can withstand
an Establishment Clause challenge only when three requirements are met: "First, the state
must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement
with religion.'" Id. (citations omitted).
45. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-15, at 1289 (2d ed.
1988). Tribe described the Marsh approach as "deeply problematic" because the Court not
only "glossed over serious ambiguities in the historical record" but, "[m]ore importantly, the
Court failed to explain how and when a history suggesting early acceptance of practice trumps
the Framers' apparent adoption of a principle inconsistent with that practice." Id. at 1291.
46. 463 U.S. at 788.
47. For a discussion of the distinction between discovery and justification in judicial opin-
ions, see RICHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961).
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explanations for results reached on other grounds, the Court's endorse-
ment of the methodology means that it will take on a life of its own and
be used by Justices and lower courts in the future.48
Whether it is the actual method of decisionmaking or the method of
explanation, there is a striking pattern found in countless cases dealing
with individual rights. The Court carefully describes historical practices,
virtually always with citations to Blackstone. The Court then rules in
favor of the government, using the historical analysis as a basis for re-
jecting the constitutional claim.
I. Why the Emphasis on History?
Two interrelated factors account for the Court's obsession with his-
tory in defining the scope of constitutional rights. First, the Court relies
on history to provide a constraint on judicial decisionmaking. Justices
want very much to make it appear that their decisions are not based on
their personal opinions, but instead are derived from an external source.
The Court has expressly defended history on this ground-that it pro-
vides an objective basis for decisions as an alternative to impermissible
value imposition by the Court.
For instance, in Stanford v. Kentucky,49 the Court upheld the impo-
sition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at
sixteen or seventeen years of age as permissible under the Eighth Amend-
ment. While rejecting the proportionality analysis established by the pre-
cedent, the Court applied its own historical analysis, stating that to adopt
the proportionality analysis would be improperly to follow "our personal
preferences" and "to replace judges of the law with a committee of phi-
losopher-kings."' 50 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Michael H,
v. Gerald D., similarly rejected an unmarried father's substantive due
process claim and warned that recognizing such rights would make con-
stitutional law " 'the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court.' "51 In Bowers v. Hardwick,52 Justice White,
writing for the majority, explained that invalidating a Georgia statute
prohibiting homosexual activity would amount to "the imposition of the
Justices' own choice of values on the States."'53
48. For an example of a lower court case based on history and tradition, see Kreimer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
49. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
50. Id. at 379 (plurality opinion).
51. 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. Id. at 191.
[Vol. 44
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History thus fulfills a powerful desire for constraint in judicial deci-
sionmaking. The search for an objective basis for constitutional interpre-
tation is in part a response to criticism of perceived judicial activism.
The decisions of the Lochner era,54 when the Court invalidated progres-
sive legislation designated to protect workers and consumers, were criti-
cized as impermissible judicial value imposition; critics said that the
Court was wrongly functioning as a "super-legislature." 5 5 Thus, as Pro-
fessor Tribe notes, "the search for ways to make judicial review legiti-
mate, given the rejection of Lochner for reasons of institutional
competence and authority, has preoccupied (one could say obsessed)
constitutional scholarship for the last forty years." 56
Moreover, critics of the Warren Court maintained that the decisions
of that era were the product of the Justices' liberal preferences and not a
result of an objective constitutional methodology.5 7 Thus, the current
Court-comprised almost exclusively of Justices nominated by Presi-
dents who opposed the Warren Court's liberal rulings-is deeply
animated by a desire for judicial constraints.
Besides, at least since Alexander Bickel called judicial review a "de-
viant institution in the American democracy, '5 8 there has been a flood of
scholarly literature seeking to reconcile judicial review with democratic
principles.59 Appeals to democracy have enormous currency, both with
the public and among scholars. An "objective" method of constitutional
interpretation would appear far more consistent with the country's com-
mitment to democratic principles.
In the 1970s and especially the 1980s, the desire for an objective
constitutional methodology led many conservative commentators and ju-
rists to embrace originalism-the view that the Constitution's meaning is
limited to that expressly stated in the text or clearly intended by the
54. The era takes its name, of course, from the landmark case of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court invalidated a maximum hour law for bakers.
55. See, eg., CHARLES G. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 425 (1959) ("The character of these decisions and the numerous restrictions
thereby placed on legislative assemblies have made it possible for the courts to invade the field
of public policy.").
56. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 8-7, at 584.
57. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 13-19 (1971).
58. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 18 (2d ed. 1986).
59. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1980); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICI-
ARY (1982).
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framers. 6° Professor Michael McConnell explained that "[t]he appeal of
originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the founda-
tional principles of the American republic... and not the political-moral
principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office."'61
A flood of scholarly criticism attacked originalism. In part, the crit-
ics of originalism focused on methodological problems of identifying the
framers and determining their collective intent.62 Also, critics argued
that originalism self-destructs because the framers did not intend that
their intent would be controlling; thus a commitment to follow the fram-
ers' intent requires that it be abandoned as a method of constitutional
interpretation. 63
Additionally, opponents of originalism described the inherent prob-
lem of determining the level of abstraction at which to state the framers'
views.64 If the framers' specific intent is controlling, then the Constitu-
tion cannot govern the modern world. The framers' specific views obvi-
ously did not contemplate modern issues such as the broadcast media,
electronic eavesdropping, or the desire to protect women and other non-
racial minorities from discrimination. Conversely, if fidelity is owed only
to the framers' abstract views, then there is little constraint in judicial
decisionmaking. At the highest level of abstraction, the framers sought
to protect values such as liberty and equality; and virtually any decision
can be reconciled with this abstract intent.
In addition to all of these problems, the Supreme Court would have
had a hard time completely embracing originalism because it is such a
dramatic departure from two hundred years of decisionmaking.
Although the Court has invoked the framers' intent since the Court's
inception, it has also protected countless rights that are neither stated in
60. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, supra note 57,
at 1; William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1976).
61. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Con-
victions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (book review).
62. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204 (1980) (concluding that nonoriginalist adjudication better protects fundamental
values and the integrity of democratic processes than does guessing how other people meant to
govern a different society in the past); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme
Court, and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 257 (1982) (asserting that often the Court's
purported reliance upon the words of the Constitution or upon the framers' intent is more
pretense than reality).
63. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985); see also Larry Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985) (arguing that originalism
cannot be normatively justified).
64. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 488, 500
(1981).
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the Constitution nor intended by the framers. Indeed, on many occa-
sions, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected originalism as the basis
for constitutional decisionmaking. In United States v. Classic,65 for ex-
ample, the Court declared:
[In deciding] whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new
subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the
framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of
government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in
all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental
purposes which the instrument itself discloses. 66
Similarly, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,67 the Court de-
nounced the view that the Constitution is limited to what the framers
intended:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a
century ago, or to insist that what the provision meant to the vision of
that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement
that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means
today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution
must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the con-
ditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a
narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable
warning-"We must never forget, that it is a Constitution we are ex-
pounding .... -68
In Brown v. Board of Education,69 the Court observed: "In ap-
proaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written."' 70 The Court's repeated rejection of originalism made it difficult
for this theory to become the Court's controlling approach to constitu-
tional interpretation.
Originalism, therefore, was so problematic for the Rehnquist Court
that it turned to historical analysis, an analysis that had not been explic-
itly rejected by the Court in earlier decisions. After all, as explained ear-
lier, since its inception, the Court has invoked history in explaining
particular decisions. Conservatives on the Court, such as Justice Scalia,
argued that to constrain decisionmaking the Court must follow traditions
stated at the most specific level of abstraction:
65. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
66. Id. at 316.
67. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
68. Id. at 442-43 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. Id. at 492.
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Because ... general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they
permit judges to dictate rather than discern society's views ...
Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges
free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule
of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable
tradition, is no rule of law at all. 7 1
At the same time, emphasizing history and tradition serves the
Court's ideological agenda. Since 1986, Presidents Reagan and Bush
have made five appointments to the Supreme Court: William Rehnquist
to the post of Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas. The Reagan and Bush Administrations openly used ideology as
a key criterion and by all accounts succeeded in moving the Court dra-
matically to the right. The Rehnquist Court's deep conservatism is re-
flected in its persistent rejection of claims of individual liberties and civil
rights and its almost complete deference to governmental institutions.72
Using history and tradition as the dominant interpretive methodol-
ogy serves this ideological agenda. The absence of protection for the con-
stitutional right explains the need for the litigation, but it also reflects the
historical lack of protection. In other words, the more successful a liti-
gant is in showing widespread, long-term violations of a right, the less
likely the Court will protect it because of society's traditional posture
concerning it. Invariably, the Court uses the absence of historical protec-
tion of a right as the basis for refusing current judicial protection. The
result is that the government continues to prevail before the Court while
individuals asserting constitutional rights usually do not prevail.73
III. What Is Wrong with the Emphasis on History?
My point is certainly not that history should be irrelevant in consti-
tutional interpretation. The Court should consider text, historical back-
ground, traditional practices, precedent, and contemporary policy
considerations whenever it is construing a constitutional provision. My
objection is to restricting the Constitution's protections solely to those
that traditionally have been safeguarded.
For many reasons, the Court's current obsession with history is un-
desirable and should be abandoned. At the very least, the Supreme
Court's use of history is often biased; the Court will read history selec-
tively to support a particular result, when a fairer reading would not
provide such support. Additionally, the Court wrongly presents history
71. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).
72. I develop this point in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Fore-




as determinative and objective, when, in fact, it is indeterminate and sub-
jective. Ultimately, history can reveal only what has been; it cannot tell
normatively what should be in the future.
A. The Supreme Court's Use of History Is Often Selective and Biased
More than a quarter of a century ago, Alfred Kelly complained of
what he called "law office" history practiced by the Supreme Court.74
Historical practices often vary. The Court picks and chooses from its
reading of history and selects those practices that confirm the conclusion
that it wants to reach. At the very least, the Court can be criticized for
its historical analysis. Moreover, the selective reading of history shows
how little history actually constrains judicial decisionmaking.
Stump v. Sparkman75 is a revealing example. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a judge has absolute immunity, when sued
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for imposing involuntary sterilization on a
teenager without any semblance of due process.76 The Supreme Court
based its holding of absolute immunity largely on its view that judges
historically had absolute immunity at common law in 1871, when section
1983 was adopted. Yet, a closer look at history reveals that judges had
absolute immunity in only 13 of 37 states that existed in 1871.77 The
Court focused on the historical practice that supported its conclusion
and simply ignored the fact that this was a minority practice at the rele-
vant time.
The same questionable reading of history is often present in First
Amendment cases. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc.,78 the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota State Fair rule
that prohibited individuals from soliciting funds or distributing literature
while walking through the fairgrounds. The Court concluded that state
fairs should not be regarded as traditional public fora.79 Yet, historical
research shows that government fairs have long been a primary place for
the gathering of people and the dissemination of information.80 The
74. Kelly, supra note 3, at 122, 125-32.
75. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
76. d at 359.
77. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326-27
(1969); see also J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity,
1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 899.
78. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
79. Id at 657.
80. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union,
and the National Council of Churches, Amici Curiae at 18-19, Heffron (No. 80-795).
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Court simply ignored this history in allowing the restriction of speech at
state fairs.
Another example from the First Amendment concerns a relatively
little-discussed provision: the clause that protects the right to petition
Congress for a redress of grievances. In McDonald v. Smith,81 the
Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on historical analysis as the ba-
sis for rejecting constitutional protection. Yet, as Eric Schnapper has
persuasively demonstrated, had the Court accurately reported and fol-
lowed history rather than dramatically misusing it, its decision would
have been different.82
McDonald involved letters written by Robert McDonald to Presi-
dent-elect Ronald Reagan, Edwin Meese, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and four members of Congress opposing the nomination of David
Smith for the position of United States Attorney for North Carolina.83
Smith brought a defamation suit against McDonald for the content of the
letters, which McDonald defended by claiming a privilege based on the
petition clause.84 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Smith, conclud-
ing that there was no historical basis for McDonald's contention that the
framers understood the right to petition to include a privilege against
suits for defamation.8 5 The Court's analysis was based almost exclu-
sively on historical analysis and old precedents, especially White v. Nich-
oils,8 6 from 1845.
Yet, had the focus truly been on history, the conclusion would have
been quite different. At English common law, statements in petitions
were deemed absolutely privileged.87 Professor Schnapper's historical re-
search shows that the petition clause owes its origin to the Seven Bishops
Case8 8 in 1688, which was the immediate cause of the petition clause in
the 1689 Bill of Rights. The Seven Bishops Case involved prosecution of
the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other bishops for seditious libel
based on the content of a petition presented to King James. The re-
sponse to that case led to the conclusion that there should be an absolute
privilege for the content of petitions to the government. Yet, the Court
81. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
82. Eric Schnapper, "Libelous" Petitions for Redress of Grievances: Bad Historiography
Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989).
83. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 481.
84. Id. at 481-82.
85. Id. at 482-83.
86. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845), overruled by Briscoe v. Lattoe, 460 U.S. 385 (1983).
87. See Lake v. King, 1 Wms. Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1668-1669), discussed
in Schnapper, supra note 82, at 329-43.
88. 12 Howell, St. Tr. 183 (1688), discussed in Schnapper, supra note 82, at 313-329.
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never discussed this history in deciding McDonald v. Smith, even though
its decision rested on historical analysis.
B. History Cannot Provide the Desired Constraint
As described in Part II, the focus on history is motivated, in part, by
a desire for an objective basis for judicial decisionmaking to constrain the
Justices and avoid results based on their personal preferences. Yet his-
tory cannot provide the sought-after constraint. Instead, history only
can reveal choices that inevitably must be made based on the Justice's
views and values. Historians long have taught that history is a matter of
interpretation. 89 Thus, the Court's presentation of history as an objective
basis for decisions really has subjective choices masquerading as objective
constraints.
Many factors account for the need for subjective choices in drawing
conclusions about historical practices. For example, there often were ge-
ographic variances in practices. In Smith v. Wade,90 the Supreme Court
considered whether individual government officers can be sued for puni-
tive damages under section 1983. Both the majority and the dissent cited
countless cases to support their views of historical practice. The reality
was simply that in some jurisdictions punitive damages were allowed and
in other jurisdictions they were not. As Justice O'Connor explained,
[b]oth opinions engage in exhaustive, but ultimately unilluminating,
exegesis of the common law of the availability of punitive damages in
1871. Although both the Court and Justice Rehnquist display admira-
ble skills in legal research and analysis of great numbers of musty
cases, the results do not significantly further the goal of the inquiry
91
In Justice O'Connor's words, "[t]he battle of the string citations can have
no winner. '"92 In a country committed to decentralized decisionmaking
as embodied in federalism, it is not surprising that countless practices
varied across the country. The result is that drawing definitive conclu-
sions about history requires choices, focusing on some practices and ig-
noring others.
Also, practices vary over time. Consider the prohibition of homo-
sexual activity at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick.93 If the focus is on the
89. See R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 218-19 (1946); Georges Florovsky,
The Study of the Past, in 2 IDEAS OF HISTORY 351, 352 (R. Nash ed., 1969) (stating that
history is "always an interpretation") (emphasis omitted).
90. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
91. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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laws that existed before 1961, then tradition supports the lack of consti-
tutional protection for private consensual homosexual activity.94 But
since 1961, almost half the states have repealed such laws.95 If this is the
focus of historical analysis, the Court came to exactly the wrong conclu-
sion in denying constitutional protection.
The tradition of protecting speech and religion has changed pro-
foundly over time. For example, there was relatively little judicial safe-
guarding of speech prior to World War 1.96 Indeed, one can count on the
fingers of one hand the Supreme Court cases that protected free speech
prior to the 1930's. If this is the focus of historical analysis, virtually
every First Amendment claim is sure to lose.
Consider incitement prosecutions as a specific example. The tradi-
tion that, especially in times of war and crisis, the government is given
broad latitude to prosecute subversive speech is exemplified in the
Court's upholding convictions in cases like Schenck v. United States,97
Whitney v. California,98 and Dennis v. United States.99 If the Court uses
history and tradition in determining the scope of judicial protection for
incitement, there will be little First Amendment protection, notwith-
standing the current, more speech-protective test announced in 1969 in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.1°
Similarly, historical practice has varied enormously with regard to
the types of government involvement in religion that are acceptable.
State churches are as much a part of history as is a commitment to a
separation of church and state. As Professor Tribe explains, some fram-
ers favored the Establishment Clause as a way of protecting state
churches from federal encroachment, while others affirmatively desired a
wall separating church and state.101 Prayers in public schools were com-
mon in the first part of the twentieth century, 10 2 but have been banned
94. See id. at 193.
95. See id. at 193-94.
96. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1213-15 (1983).
97. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding the conviction of a person for circulating leaflets that
argued that conscription is unconstitutional involuntary servitude).
98. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (uphold-
ing the conviction of an individual under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act for attend-
ing a Communist Labor Party convention).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions of the leaders of the Communist Party for
advocacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology).
100. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
101. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 14-3, at 1158-59.
102. Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the "Wall of Separa-
tion" and Its Impact on Religious World View, 54 U. PIrr. L. REV. 325, 327 (1992).
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for the last three decades.103 Decisions based on history must choose
which traditions to honor and which to discard.
Additionally, there often has been a great variance between the law
as it is stated on the books and the law as it is enforced. Laws prohibit-
ing homosexual activity may long have been on the books, but are rarely
enforced. I°4 Similarly, obscenity laws are virtually unused in many parts
of the country.10 5 Which tradition counts?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the need to choose
the level of abstraction at which to state the tradition. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook noted, "Traditions are constructs and may be described in
many ways." 10 6 If the focus is on tradition at the most specific level of
analysis, there will be relatively little judicial protection of rights. Alter-
natively, if one can abstractly define tradition, judicial value choices are
inevitable. Given American history's diversity, a tradition can be found
to support or condemn almost any practice. As Garry Wills remarked:
"[R]unning men out of town on a rail is at least as much an American
tradition as declaring unalienable rights." 10 7 As with original intent, the
choice of how to describe the tradition requires a choice of the level of
abstraction, and virtually any result can be justified as consistent with the
American tradition of protecting liberty and advancing equality.
Consider a concrete example: whether sidewalks on postal proper-
ties should be considered a public forum, which was the issue in United
States v. Kokinda.08 Sidewalks long have been considered the paradig-
matic public forum. 0 9 Therefore, if the issue of sidewalks is viewed gen-
erally, there is little doubt that the Court in Kokinda should have
protected access to postal sidewalks for speech purposes. But the Court
instead looked at the question much more narrowly as whether there is a
right of access to the specific property involved and concluded that man-
agers of postal properties could close to speech those sidewalks leading
from parking lots to front entrances.110
103. See, eg., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
104. Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and
Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 859, 865-66 (1990).
105. Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Comment, What Films We May Watch: Videotape Distribu-
tion and the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1988).
106. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 349, 351
(1992); see also Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1992) (ad-
vocating a more abstract approach to constitutional decisionmaking).
107. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA at xiii (1978).
108. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
109. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
110. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-28.
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The ultimate point is that the Court had to make a choice. History
cannot serve the Court's goal of constraining decisionmaking. At most,
it provides an objective-sounding basis for the Justices' subjective
choices.
C. The Court's Reliance on History Confuses Normative and Descriptive
Issues
The Court commits a logical fallacy by using descriptive statements
to answer normative questions. The core issue in almost all constitu-
tional law cases before the Supreme Court is what the Constitution
should be interpreted to mean. Examination of history only can tell what
has been; it never can reveal what should be. Justice Blackmun ex-
pressed this in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick: "[T]he fact that the
moral judgments expressed by statutes... may be' "natural and familiar
... ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question of whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." ' " 111 Simply put, what "is" never answers what "ought" to be.
Yet frequently the Supreme Court invokes tradition as if it is suffi-
cient to answer the normative questions. For example, in the recent case
Lee v. Weisman, 112 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion was a scathing at-
tack on the majority's decision to invalidate clergy-delivered prayers at
public school graduations. 1 3 Scalia objected that the majority "lays
waste a tradition that is as old as public-school graduation ceremonies
themselves." 11 4 He simply assumed that the traditional existence of a
practice is sufficient to make it normatively permissible under the
Constitution.
While it might be possible to construct a normative theory to justify
using history as the basis for decisionmaking, no such theory has yet
been offered. The central justification for the Court's reliance on tradi-
tion has been the desire to constrain judicial decisionmaking. Yet, as
explained above, history and tradition cannot serve this objective.
Moreover, if history normatively should be the basis for judicial
decisionmaking, there is a need for a theory to explain when tradition
should be followed and when it should be discarded. Obviously, not all
traditions should be followed. Segregation was a part of the tradition of
111. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting))).
112. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
113. Id. at 2678-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the South and its approval was part of the sad historical legacy of racism.
Yet, the Court rightly abandoned this tradition. If there is a theoretical
basis for believing that what has existed is normatively desirable, how
can some traditions be deemed undesirable and abandoned?
Moreover, to give normative significance to historical practices is to
assume that an unchallenged, unreviewed government action should be
presumed constitutional, even though it might have been disapproved if
challenged earlier. The fact that a practice was never reviewed or invali-
dated by a court does not mean that it is constitutional. Yet, that is the
implicit assumption when the very existence of a practice is deemed to be
conclusive evidence of its constitutionality.
Nor does the fact that an earlier Court approved a practice necessar-
ily indicate that it should be regarded as constitutional today. Bradwell
v. Illinois' 1 5 approved the exclusion of women from the practice of law,
yet surely the historical approval of such discrimination does not justify
the practice today. Society is constantly changing and its moral stan-
dards are perpetually evolving. The Constitution must reflect these
changes and this cannot be accomplished through a method of interpre-
tation that is primarily based on Blackstone, English common law, and
nineteenth century precedents.
Conclusion
Even though the Court always has discussed historical practices in
justifying its conclusions, the emphasis on tradition as a limit on the
scope of rights is new. The constant use of history to justify conservative
results leads to the cynical conclusion that the country has a seventeenth
century Court as it enters the twenty-first century. It is not enough to
make one want to take all the history books out of the Supreme Court's
library, but it makes one come close.
115. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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